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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2557 
_____________ 
 
FRANCIS V. HUBER;  
JEAN L. HUBER,  
 
                      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
MAURICE A. LAWRUK;  
PENN ALTO HOTEL, INC.;  
PENN ALTO SERVICES, INC.;  
PENN ALTO ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 07-145) 
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 3, 2011) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
2 
 
 Francis V. Huber and Jean L. Huber (“Appellants” or “the Hubers”) seek review1 
of the decision of the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting, in 
part, Appellants’ motion for summary judgment.  Specifically, the District Court found 
Penn Alto Associates Limited Partnership (“PAA”) liable for the principal and interest 
due under a promissory note for the sale of the Penn Alto Hotel.  The District Court also 
granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants on all other claims in the 
complaint.
2
  While we find the question of our appellate jurisdiction troublesome,
3
 we 
                                              
1
 The notice of appeal filed by the Hubers also sought to appeal the District 
Court’s decision on the Huber’s claim for attorney’s fees.  However, the Hubers did not 
raise any arguments in their opening brief with respect to this order.  As such, they have 
waived this claim.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well 
settled that an appellant's failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”); FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9). 
2
 In their complaint, the Hubers alleged that Penn Alto Hotel, Inc. (“PAH”), which 
changed its name to Penn Alto Services, Inc. (“PAS”), and Maurice A. Lawruk 
(“Lawruk”), as partners in PAA, were liable for PAA’s breach of the note.  Additionally, 
the Hubers sought to pierce the corporate veils of PAA, PAS and PAH in order to find 
Lawruk liable for the damages associated with the breach of the note.  The Hubers had 
not sought summary judgment on the first count of their complaint, which they later 
voluntarily dismissed. 
3
  Our concern about our jurisdiction arises from the timing of the filing of the 
notice of appeal.  On March 29, 2010, the District Court entered an order adopting the 
parties’ stipulation of damages.  The District Court ruled on the motion for attorney’s 
fees on May 25, 2010.  The notice of appeal was filed on May 27, 2010.  In Budinich v. 
Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988), the Supreme Court adopted a 
“uniform rule that an unresolved issue of attorney’s fees for the litigation in question does 
not prevent judgment on the merits from being final.” We have recognized one exception 
to the general rule established by the Supreme Court.  The exception occurs “where the 
attorneys’ fees are an integral part of the contractual relief being sought.”  Local Union 
No. 1992 of the Internat’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. The Okonite Co., 358 
F.3d 278, 287 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004).  While the Hubers cited § 3.3 of the note in their briefs 
seeking attorney’s fees, they made no mention of this section of the note in their 
complaint.  As such, we are unable to determine the true basis for their request for 
attorney’s fees — the note or common law.  If they sought relief under the note, their 
appeal would be timely. If they sought relief under the common law, their appeal would 
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nonetheless conclude that the appeal has no merit.  For the reasons set forth in the District 
Court’s opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                                                                                                                                  
be untimely.  Since the ultimate outcome of the case will be the same, we are assuming, 
for the sake of this opinion, that the Hubers sought attorney’s fees pursuant to § 3.3, thus 
avoiding a nettlesome jurisdictional question. 
